

# THE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE DIMENSION IN THE PROFIT SHARING SYSTEM FOR EACH PERIOD OF FISHING TECHNOLOGY USAGE (A Study on Exchange and Profit Sharing between Punggawa and Sawi in Marobo Village, Muna)

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## THE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE DIMENSION IN THE PROFIT SHARING SYSTEM FOR EACH PERIOD OF FISHING TECHNOLOGY USAGE

(A Study on Exchange and Profit Sharing between

Punggawa and Sawi in Marobo Village, Muna)

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### ABSTRACT

A study of the phenomenon of differences in sources and exchange of value between *punggawa* and *sawi* is important to conduct to make clear the position of those two sides, especially in the balance of profit sharing. The purpose of this study was to analyze the sources of exchange that each fisherman group has (*punggawa* and *sawi*) and its implications on the profit-sharing system in patron-client relations in Marobo Village, Muna. This study applied a qualitative method. Data analysis began with reducing data by summarizing data that were closely related to fisherman patronage activities. The results showed that the resources exchanged by a *punggawa* in Marobo Village were boats with various types based on their usage period, fishing gear, and money. The boats were used to do fishing activities in the fishing ground. The farther the fishing ground was, the greater the boat capacity would be needed. Meanwhile, the only resource exchanged by a *sawi* was energy (both physical power and fishing skills). A *sawi* generally works in the fishing sector because they do not have other skills.

**Keywords:** Profit Sharing, Fishermen, Patron-Client, Exchange, Change of Technology

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### I. INTRODUCTION

For production activities (fishing), fishermen, especially workers, mostly depend on good relations with the skipper (boat owner). This situation is in line with a study conducted by Hamzah et al. (2019) that the limited source of capital experienced by fishermen (labor fishermen) forces them to establish patron-client relations. This is due to a lack of financial capital that they have. This lack of capital exacerbates the burden, challenges, and competition in the use of marine resources. Labor fishermen with the ability and skill to catch fish have the potential to be an advantage. On the other hand, the absence of capital is an obstacle, considering that the sea area is an open area that can be used by anyone who has the ability to manage its resources.

Due to these conditions, relationships between groups are constructed, such as patron-client relations. Blau (Ritzer, 2004) illustrated that when a person hopes for help from others, while there is nothing that can be exchanged in return from himself, then there are four alternative possibilities. First, he can force others to help them. Second, he looks for other resources to meet his needs. Third, he should be patient to get help from others. Fourth, he subordinates himself to others so that he can give others a kind of "debt of gratitude".

The key assumptions of exchange theory can strengthen the analysis of the development of client-patron relations. Those assumptions, according to Haryanto (2012) are as follows. (1) Behavior is motivated by the desire to increase results and avoid losses (increase positive impacts and reduce negative impacts); (2) Exchange relations develop in a mutual dependence structure either because of the same reasons for the parties involved in the exchange for resources or because of no desire to build a network of exchange relations; (3) Mutually involved actors increase exchanges with particular partners on other occasions; (4) The valuable impact will follow the economic law on decreasing marginal utility or the psychological principle of satisfaction. In the context of the fishing community in Marobo Village, the existing patron-client relations can occur between businessmen (boat owners) and labor fishermen. In other words, there is a vertical relationship due to differences in status between patrons and clients. Vertical relationships due to differences in status always lead to a mutually beneficial exchange between patrons and clients. This exchange relationship has implications for the proportion of profit-sharing obtained between those two groups. This exchange relationship can be found in several studies that have resulted in differences in income for patrons and clients. For instance, the limited sources of capital experienced by fishermen (labor fishermen) force them to establish a patron-client relation (Hamzah et al, 2019). This is more due to differences in the control of resources, especially wealth (Zulkifli, 1989). Furthermore, this condition is human efforts to survive in certain circumstances because it is part of a human adaptation strategy (Boissevain, 1966). It can also be caused by a special exchange between two parties in which they feel compelled to have allies, namely between those with superior status and those with inferior status (Hefni M, 2009).

## II. METHODS

This study was conducted from April to August 2019, in Marobo Village, Poasia, Muna, Southeast Sulawesi. The research location was chosen purposively by considering that access to the location was easy, the personal relationship between the researchers and the prospective informants (respondents) had been well-established beforehand, the majority of the people in the location worked as fishermen, and the *punggawa-sawi* (patron-client) relation was highly prominent there.

The type of this study was qualitative research. This kind of research was used to examine the conditions of natural objects in which the researchers became a key instrument, in other words, explaining facts through individual actions. The basis of qualitative research is Max Weber's thought that the main point of sociological research is not social symptoms, but the meanings behind individual actions that lead to the realization of these social symptoms. Qualitative research, according to Gunawan (2013), is intended to understand human behavior from the actors' reference framework, namely how the actors view and interpret activities from their standpoint. The type of this study was a case study that aimed to fully examine the phenomenon of exchange that had an impact on the results obtained between patrons (*punggawa*) and clients (*sawi*).

This study began by selecting informants purposively based on predetermined criteria, namely those who highly know and understand the problem and were directly involved in the studied problem. The selected patrons were those who had held the position for at least two decades (1980-1990, 1991-2000, or 2001-present), or used two or more different modes of production. For collecting qualitative data, the informants were selected based on preliminary information about the local residents involved in fishing activities as labor fishermen, traditional fishermen, and fish sellers. Information found in this study was mainly expected from instructions from village government officials or the head of the neighborhood. In addition, informants who were interviewed were asked for recommendations on other residents who could become informants.

## III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### Types and Dimensions of the Exchange

The results of this study indicated that the patron-client relation as characterized by Scott (Salman, 2006) was found in Marobo Village, although it did not have the completely same characteristics. Based on observations and interviews with informants, the characteristics of patron-client relations in Marobo Village are the existence of inequality in exchange which describes the difference in wealth more than power and position.

Resources that are exchanged by a *punggawa* in Marobo Village are boats with various types based on the period of use, fishing gear, and money. The boats are used to do fishing activities in the fishing ground. The farther the fishing ground is, the greater the boat capacity will be needed. These boats have also undergone modification from traditional fishing using non-motorized boats to the use of purse-seine boats that are used by fishermen currently. Capital owners (*punggawa*) invest in the procurement of these boats. The fishing gear used has also been modified from the traditional fishing system using fishing rods and traps to the use of purse-seines that are used in the present day. The fishing gear is also invested by a *punggawa*.

The resource of exchange that is also owned by the *punggawa* is money. Apart from investing in boats and fishing gear, a *punggawa* also usually provides assistance in terms of capital loans for a *sawi*. The money is sometimes used by a *sawi* for children's schooling, health services, home repairs, or other purposes. The money is used with consequences of agreements that have been mutually agreed upon related to fishing activities or outside fishing activities.

According to informant Am, a *punggawa*:

*"Pasti kita tidak inginkan sawi itu kerja tidak bagus karena pusing tidak punya uang. Kita juga mengerti dengan itu. Mereka juga ada anak yang sekolah, atau mau perbaiki rumahnya. Jadi ya.. Kita bantu"*

[Surely, we do not want a *sawi* to work poorly because of having no money. We understand that. They must have children who have to go to school or a house to repair. So, yeah, ... we will help.]

Meanwhile, the only resource that a *sawi* can exchange is energy (both physical abilities and catching skills). A *sawi* generally works in the fishing sector because they do not have other skills. Therefore, they feel that they have no other job alternative. These limited skills cause a *sawi* to only concentrate on one type of work that is more related to physical activities.

According to informant Et, a *sawi*:

*Saya tidak sampe tamat SMA. Tidak bisa juga kerja yang lain. Paling-paling bawa ojek. Sekarang hampir semua orang punya motor jadi penumpang sepi. Kita hanya bisa ikut pagae.*

[I did not finish high school. I also cannot do other work. At best, I can only work as a motorcycle taxi. Currently, almost everyone has a motorbike so that there are only fewer passengers. Therefore, we can only follow a *pagae* [a fisherman who use purse seines].]

Although a *sawi* works by joining a fishing organization (production organization), they also have considerations in choosing a patron (*punggawa*) to work. Some opinions expressed by informants who work as a *sawi* indicated that a *sawi* will choose a *punggawa* with several considerations, such as being able to provide/fulfill their main needs (subsistence), having family, relative, or neighbor relations, and honesty.

Informant Et, a *sawi*, said:

*"Ada banyak (beberapa) pemilik kapal (punggawa) bisa kita bekerja. Kita pilih karena kita anggap mereka jujur, kalau bagi hasil yang adil. Kita juga masuk kesitu (memilih punggawa) karena supaya kita bisa hidup. Saya ikut karena yang punya kapal itu termasuk kakek saya. Teman-teman lain juga pasti begitu."*

[There are several boat owners (*punggawa*) that we can work with. We select those that we consider honest in terms of sharing profits. We join them so that we can live. I join on the boat because its owner can be said to be my grandfather. My other friends must have had such considerations.]

The fulfillment of basic needs is the main consideration for a *sawi* to work in a fishing group. These needs can be obtained by making exchange relations through a fishing system that applies *punggawa-sawi* relations. This relation pattern allows a *sawi* to earn income for a certain period of time from the earnings, in this case, the profit-sharing. With this income, a *sawi* can afford subsistence needs.

This situation is in line with what was stated by Blau (Poloma, 2004) regarding exchange structuralism that there are two behavioral preconditions that lead to social exchange. First, the behavior must be only goal-oriented through



interaction with other people. Second, the behavior must aim to obtain the means for achieving these goals. The desired goals can be in the form of extrinsic rewards (money, goods, or services) or intrinsic rewards (honor or affection).

In line with it, Simola (2014) suggested that there are three main factors that occur in the life of a *punggawa*, namely (1) social status, (2) ownership, and (3) personality of a *punggawa* towards the *sawi*. However, according to informant Ed, a *sawi*, their obedience to the *punggawa* is due to their high dependence on livelihood sources.

The difference in resources that can be exchanged plays more in the context of fishing activities. Initially, the relationship also emphasized the ascribed status (genealogy, community leadership, or nobility) of a *punggawa*. A similar situation was experienced by one of the informant Ed's uncles who used to work as a *sawi*. According to him, when he used the outboard motorboat, a *punggawa* could be positioned the same as their parents. A *punggawa* can take advantage of a *sawi* after fishing activities. Meanwhile, a *sawi* will not refuse to follow what the *punggawa* wants.

<sup>2</sup> The development of the patron-client relations between the *punggawa* and *sawi* also implies the emergence of rational economic relations, for example, between payables and receivables. This condition creates an "uncomfortable" feeling for a *sawi* to move to the other *pagae* groups with a different *punggawa*. It is in line with what is stated by informant SI, a *sawi*, that "I once had a debt with a *punggawa* so that I was uncomfortable to change a boat for work." In exchange theory, Blau (Poloma, 2004) began his thesis by accepting the principles and phenomena of individual attraction and desire to share the kind of social reward. The desire for social rewards is something that is given and expected to bring other rewards intrinsically and extrinsically.

However, a *punggawa* also sometimes does not pay attention to the ratio of the adequate amount of reward for a *sawi*, meaning that the limitation on the amount is not strictly determined. In one trip, sometimes, the number of *sawi* in a boat is 25 people, even though 20 people have been enough for the fishing activity. According to informant HS, Ar, & Al, this is because of the belief that more sharing can bring more sustenance. This shows a high spirit of togetherness (togetherness norms) among fishermen in which Scott (1972) called local subsistence ethics.

The description of *punggawa-sawi* relations before the use of modern *gae* production facilities is as follows.

An owner of a *sampan* (a traditional boat) who employed several people did not make a binding work agreement. They did not provide fishing rods so that a *sawi* provided the fishing rods by themselves. The applied profit-sharing system was a fixed payment system or a 50: 50 system. A *sawi* is required to give half of their catch to the *punggawa* either in cash or in fish. This system was implemented and was not burdensome because the catch can fluctuate depending on the season, weather, and the physical condition of the fishermen. Meanwhile, for the payment system, a *sawi* was required to give a certain number of fish or money from the sale of fish to the boat owner (*punggawa*).

The following is the result of the interview with informant Lm, a *sawi*.

"Waktu masih di kampung lama, saya kerja ikut perahu. Kita bawa pancing sendiri karena tidak disediakan. Ikan yang ditangkap sebagian kita setor. Atau bisa juga setelah dijual uangnya dibagi dua, satu bagian buat saya satu bagian buat dia. Kalau sistem setoran berat, karena belum tentu kita dapat ikan banyak dalam satu hari".

[When I was in the old village, I worked on a boat. We brought our own fishing rod because it was not provided. Some of the fish that we catch was given [to the boat owner]. If not, the money from selling the fish was divided into two, one part for me and one part for him [the boat owner]. The payment system was burdensome because we uncertainly were able to catch a lot of fish in a day.]

Boat owners also prefer the 50:50 revenue sharing system. They are afraid that implementing a payment system will be burdensome so that no one will work on the boats provided because it can make the boat owners have to go out to sea by themselves or get nothing.

In this period, fishermen's income was still limited to subsistence needs with a limited catch volume. Almost all fishermen everywhere still used simple production facilities. The limited catch volume caused fishermen to be unable to invest in these production facilities. This was due to the fact that limited fishing volume resulted in reduced income.

The results of an interview with one of the informants strengthened the concern that a *sawi* would stop working or switch to other boat owners, as stated by an informant Ar (58), a *punggawa*, as follows.

*"Kalau mereka sampe pindah pada perahu lain karena tidak mampu kasih setoran, kita jadi rugi. Waktu itu saya bawa sampan sama 2 orang yang ikut. Jadi saya bisa dapat setengah mereka dan hasil yang saya dapat sendiri. Kalau mereka tidak kerja berarti saya hanya dapat ikan yang saya pancing sendiri. Kalau saya lihat tangkapannya sedikit saya juga hanya ambil sedikit tidak sampe setengahnya".*

[If they move to another boat because they cannot afford to pay, we will lose money. At that time, I brought the boat with 2 people so that I can get half of the result and the rewards that I get in joining the boat. If they do not work, then I only get fish that I catch myself. If I see the catch is only a little, I will only take a little as well, even not half of it.]

The pattern of production relations does not show exploitative characteristics by the owner of the means of production (*punggawa*). The pattern of patron-client relations is in line with subsistence basic ethics by Scott (1992) that farmers adhere to the principle of equity in which the yield is evenly shared because they believe in the moral right of farmers to live adequately.

### **Social Structure**

The activities of catching fish or loading and unloading the catch are strongly influenced by the presence of crew members (*sawi*). *Sawi* is the main component in fishing activities with various positions and tasks. The recruitment of a *sawi* by boat owners is carried out based on the strong communal structure of the Makassarese-Buginese tradition. They are recruited based on family or neighborhood relationships. However, it does not override the individual's ability to go to sea. It can be concluded that the patron-client relation is still egalitarian. The nature of the work of a *sawi* is free workers without a permanent work bond with the boat owner. However, the difference in the ownership status of the means of fishing production makes a *sawi* still respect the boat owner. The social structure of society during the subsistence period creates the structure of communal society. According to Houtt, the characteristics of communal society are the low division of labor, the prominence of primary relationships, and the strong ties to tradition (Amaludin, 1985).

There are only two types of positions, namely a *punggawa* as boat owner acting as a helmsman and one or two crews called *sawi* who are usually the children or relatives of the boat owner. This position is formed because various differentiations in fishing activities are not needed. For the dimension of the type of layer as part of the existing stratification, it only includes the top layer which is occupied by the boat owner at the fishing group level. Meanwhile, in the context of the community, the top layer is occupied by the aristocratic group and boat owners. Society still places individuals with aristocratic status at the top layer.

In the dimension of the profit-sharing system, half of the catch (50%) is handed over to the boat owner, that is half of the total fish obtained or half of the total money from the sale of fish. No target catch in a day is given by the boat owner so that it can be said that there is a pattern of non-exploitative relationships between all elements in the fishing group. Furthermore, fishermen's sociological changes occur as a result of the use of outboard motor facilities, following new production methods that replaced the *sampan* as a previous production method. The need for a boat cleaner position in the fishing activities is very important as an addition to the division of labor (differentiation). Therefore, a *sawi* working to catch fish will not be disturbed by the condition of the boat that is easily entered by water or dirt.

This also strengthens Smelser's thesis (Suwarsono and So, 2000) regarding the establishment of new positions in an organization that provides specific tasks to make the whole working process more effective and efficient. The provision of job specifications for a water cleaner is the result of changes in boat technology. According to informant HSb, a *punggawa*, a *sawi* who is considered capable of carrying out various work positions was assigned

this task. However, over time, this position requires a *sawi* to put extra effort into doing multiple tasks at the same time. Compliance with the *punggawa* for a *sawi* or a water cleaner is not only because of the boat ownership status by the *punggawa*, but the *punggawa* with his status as a helmsman has also the authority to determine the catching time and area. This is because his knowledge as a helmsman is not in doubt (from the result of an interview with the informant who is a former *punggawa*).

The caught fish is sold in fish auctions (PPI Muna currently). In the implemented profit-sharing system, the money earned is divided concerning net profit and the sum of the cost of fuel, supplies, repairs, and fees for sales at the fish auction. Furthermore, the net profit is divided into 2 parts. The boat owner acting as the *punggawa* receives one part, while another part becomes the right of a *sawi*. Meanwhile, the *punggawa* due to his position as helmsman receives an additional part because of positioning as a part of *sawi*.

The profit-sharing system has become an institution in fishermen's life. However, when a new *sawi* is joining the outboard motorbike boat, the system is still discussed together. Although profit sharing is arranged by the *punggawa* at his house or other places determined by the *punggawa*, manipulation or unfair distribution never happens. According to informant HSb, a *punggawa*, the profit-sharing system must be conveyed to all *sawi* before going to the sea. This is expected to reduce mistrust between the two parties regarding catching management. The same thing happened when HSb worked as a *sawi* in a boat belonging to Chinese businessmen.

In addition, the provision of fish bonuses (*jame-jame*) to a *sawi* has also already been applied. These bonuses are intended as a side dish for their family. For a one-day dish, these bonuses have been considered more than enough, especially when the catch is significant so that the *sawi* can also sell the bonuses (*jame-jame*, in Javanese terms, is called *lawuhan*). Employees really enjoyed the fish bonuses given. Informant Bc (49), a *sawi*, said:

"*Jame-jame yang didapat kita jual di pelelangan. Hasil yang dijual kita bisa beli rokok atau kebutuhan lainnya. Jame-jame tidak mungkin habis kita makan satu hari. Jadi sisanya kita jual dan selalu ada yang beli. Jame itu bikin kita sawi senang untuk bekerja*".

[We sell the *jame-jame* given at the auction. What we got can be used to buy cigarettes or other necessities. *Jame-jame* cannot run out if we eat it in one day only. Therefore, we sell the rest and always buy something. *Jame-jame* makes us [*sawi*] happy to work.]

#### IV. CONCLUSION

From the various illustrations above, in brief, the process of the establishment of the *punggawa-sawi* relations in Marobo Village indicated that the relations begin with the desire to maintain life or livelihoods with the transition from individual business units to group businesses. This was signified by a shift in the use of facilities without machines to facilities equipped with machines. This stimulus supports the work ethic of fishermen, such as Buginese fishermen who are known for their mobility and innovation in fulfilling their daily needs. These innovations are related to increasing production, effectiveness, and efficiency of work. The difference in resources possessed by the patron (*punggawa*) and the client (*sawi*) causes them to be together in mutual patron-client relations. The patron provides the resources in terms of the boat, fishing gear, and money. Meanwhile, the client is with the physical energy to support fishing activities until marketing the catch. The dynamics of the relations follow the development of fishing technology which can change depending on the creativity and innovation of fishermen. Various parties still consider the existence of patron-client (*punggawa-sawi*) relations as an obstacle to the development of fishing communities. This is, among others, due to the strong negative view that patrons (*punggawa*) exploit the clients (*sawi*). This opinion is very different from the perception of a *sawi* towards the system. The *punggawa-sawi* relation is an institution that is very important to support the sustainability of local economic activities. In another position, the patron (*punggawa*) can be asked for input or opinion as to the supervisor of the fishing community development program.

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